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Our study examines if investors had been behaving
rationally during the Hong Kong stock market crash in
1987. Various tests were employed to test this
rationality and the results were positive. On the basis
of such rationality, a Graham Formula was applied to the
Hong Kong stock market to show that gross over-valuation
of shares can be used as a warning signal of an impending
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3FOREWORD
This report on the study of the Hong Kong stock market
crash in October 1987 is the concerted effort of the four
of us, Ho Chi-Sze, Grace, Tang Hoi-Yee, Annie, Poon
Chun-Pong, Daniel and Wong Wai-Ming. In deference to the
regulations of the Three-year MBA Programme of the Chinese
University of Hong Kong, we have to however artificially
split our report into two parts for binding into separate
volumes:
Investors' Rationality during the CrashPart On
Share Valuation and Crash PredictionPart Two
Each of the two parts cannot stand alone; only when the
two are read together is our report complete.
We regret any inconvenience caused to readers by
disrupting their otherwise smooth reading between the two
parts.
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For ease of reference, Part Two which has been bound in
a separate volume, is reproduced as Supplement at the end
of this Part One report.
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The stock market crash of 1987 was a global event and
so tumultuous that many have yet to recover from its
effect. In the United States, it was worse than the
infamous 1929 Wall Street collapse, an event which
heralded the start of the Great Depression. In Hong Kong,
the stock market lost HK$76.5 billion in value or 11% on
Black Monday, 19th October, 1987 and was subsequently
closed for the following four days. The market reopened
on the following Monday, 26th October, 1987 and it lost a
total of HK$204.2 billion in value or 33.3% just on that
day.
We believe that there are many aspects of the
Crash in Hong Kong worth studying and we have selected to





There is a consensus among professionals worldwide that
the Crash was prima facie a United States led phenomenon.
It probably started with the announcement of the
disappointing August 1987 trade deficit in the United
States. The market expected further weakness in the US
dollar and consequently a further rise in interest rate in
United States would be necessary to support the US dollar.
Such expectation drove bond prices down and eventually
pushed the bond yield above the 10% psychological level.
The equity market also dropped at the same time pushing the
yield on equity to a high level to reduce the gap between
yield on bond and equity. The Dow Jones Industrial Average
Index (DJIA), the most widely used indicator in the
United States's equity markets, dropped by 95 points on
14th October,1987 and it was one of the heaviest single-day
losses in the history in the United States. The 3.8% drop
in DJIA was severe, but stock markets in other parts of the
world reacted only mildly on the following day: London
fell by 1.2%, Tokyo by 0.8% and Hong Kong by only 0.4%.
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However, the concern over further weakness of the US
dollar and disagreement between the US and West Germany
over the latter's intention to tighten. its monetary policy
continued. Either of such concern would result in a
further escalation of interest rates and the New York
stock market continued to fall by 2.4% on 15th October,
1987 and another 4.6% the following day. Over those three
days of trading, the New York market lost in total 10% of
its value. The Asian markets fell by a much less
significant proportion. The London market was spared a
fall on 16th October, 1987 as trading had virtually
stopped on that day as a result of a devastating
hurricane.
the Crash
The real Crash started when the Asian markets
re-opened the following week. What looked like a routine
stock market correction suddenly turned into a panic
driven avalanche. The Tokyo market took the lead and the
Nikkei Index lost 2.4% on 19th October, 1987, followed by
an 11% drop of the Hang Seng Index in Hong Kong and a 10%
drop of the Financial Times 30 Index in London. The New
York market suffered its heaviest single day loss in
history. During Black Monday, DJIA recorded a precipitous
drop of 23%. From then on the world stock markets were
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gripped by a vicious cycle of panic and fear. In the nine
trading days between 14th October and 26th October, 1987,
London shares lost 29% of their value. US shares value
shed 28%. Holders of Japanese shares found that the value
of their holdings dropped by 16%.
In Hong Kong, the Hang Seng Index fell by an
accumulated 41% in the same period. In view of the
confusion and disorder in the market, and concerns
regarding possibility of panic selling and settlement
back-log, the General Committee of the Stock Exchange of
Hong Kong decided to close the market for four days from
20th to 23rd October, 1987. With the back log of sell
orders accumulating over the four days of market closure,
the Hang Seng Index then tumbled by a devastating 1120
points in one single day when the market re-opened on 26th
October, 1987.
A Preliminary Analysis of the Crasl
Although authorities in both the United States and
London had commissioned studies into the cause of the
Crash, a full explanation of the Crash is still not yet
available. However, we are of the view that the following
main reasons are pertinent:-
5(a) The dual deficit problem in the United States.
The United States budget deficit was huge and the
United States' trade gap appeared to be worsening.
Many investors began to believe that the United States
would not be able to resolve the problem and a
recession was inevitable. This would have a knock-on
effect on other countries.
(b) New legislation on takeovers.
The United States Government passed legislation to
reduce the activities of corporate raiders. This
caused selling of stocks which are "in play".
(c) Disagreement of monetary policy between the United
States and Germany.
United States Treasury Secretary James Baker went head
to head with the President of Bundesbank, Helmut Pohl,
regarding Germany interest rates. This caused
concerns about the integrity of the Louvre Accord
which could signal an end of a pact to support the US
dollar.
(d) Possible new monetary units of US dollar.
James Baker announced the existence of a task force
which was studying a new monetary unit consisting of a
basket of currencies linked for inflation calculations
6to the commodity prices. This caused concern for the
dollar standard which has been under pressure for more
fundamental economic reasons.
(e) Further increase in interest rate.
While a discount rate increase to protect the dollar
caused a ratcheting up of interest rates, it also
caused further concerns with regards to the future
csrowth in the US economv_
(f) New investment instrument- Programme Trading.
The use of portfolio insurance programme trading
between an index of stocks and the stocks themselves,
and the use of market derivatives to achieve liquidity
in the equity markets heightened volatility.
The result of these factors in the United States then
unnerved equity investors throughout the world. The Crasr
then followed.
Examining the Crash
Any study of the Crash therefore has to be related to
the United States stock market. There have been a
flourish of books and articles written about various
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aspects of the Crash in the past year. They have given us
useful insights and a selection have been listed at the
end of the paper. However we have been most intrigued by
an article written by Avner Arbel, Steven Carvell and Erik
Postneiks in the Harvard Business Review, May-June 1988,
entitled "The Smart Crash of October 19th".
The article first tested whether or not during the
critical and apparently chaotic situation in the Crash of
1987, the United States stock market had maintained its
rational behaviour. Four tests were conducted and the
conclusion was affirmative: the market had behaved
rationally during the Crash. The four supporting findings
were:-
(a) shares that had gone up most before the Crasr
went down most during the Crash;
(b) shares of industries which had a high degree of
discretionary spending had fallen the most
whereas those of industries which were on
necessities had fallen the least;
(c) shares of companies undergoing restructuring lost
much more than the market as a whole;
8(d) the relationship established between basic risk
of shares, share price performance and market
uncertainty, with the changes in share price
from 1st to 19th October, 1987 resembled an
orderly return to a risk averse fundamental
approach in choosing shares to sell during the
Crash.
Inspired by this study, the objective of Part I of our
study is to test whether or not despite the apparent chaos
during the Crash, the Hong Kong stock market had
maintained its rational behaviour.
The article also examined the question of whether or
not the Crash had been or could have been predicted. It
found that `few players saw the collapse coming' and
worse, stockbrokers `created and continuously supported
the speculative optimism that preceded the crisis' and
fund managers were in 'a complete failure to predict the
market slide'. Their conclusion was that `none of the most
active participants in the market's regular activities
foresaw the depth, suddenness, or brevity of the
correction. Everybody was caught off-guard and everybody
was wrong.'
9It then chose to test the ability of the Graham
Formula in predicting the Crash using data from the United
States stock market. Initially this formula was described
as a `very simple, almost naive, value-based investment
formula'. But the findings led the authors of the article
to conclude that this formula is a forgotton but in fact
very powerful tool to predict the Crash.
We are sceptical about this alleged ability to predict
the Crash using the Graham Formula. Therefore the
objective of Part II of our study is to test whether or
not using pre-Crash data from the Hong Kong stock market,
the Graham Formula could have predicted the crash in Hong
Kong in October 1987. Since we found certain shortcomings
in the formula, we have proceeded to propose an
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CHAPTER III
PART TWO RESEARCH STRATEGY AND METHODOLOGY
Part two of our study is to test whether or not the
Graham Formula could have predicted the Hong Kong stock
market Crash in October 1987.
Oblivion to the impending Crash
We studied the views or proresslonal investors
expressed during the period between 1st .3eptember, 1987
and 19th October, 1987 to see if they had given any
indication that they were aware of an imminent crash in
the Hong Kong stock market. Table 3.1 is a list of the
articles and commentaries we examined.
We found that before the end of September, 1987 there
were cautious comments foreshadowing a slump in the market
but these relatively prudent comments subsided in
October 1987. Bullish remarks then significantly
outweighed bearish ones possibly as a result of the Hang
Seng Index having hit an all time high of 3968 on 1st




PLTBLISHED VIEWS OF PROFESSIONAL INVESTORS
SourceKey PointsCommentatorsDate
SCMPThP Hnno Yona market is a little bit overheatec6/9/87 P Jacobs, financial Secretary
MPThe Hong Kong market would fall gradually in the next 3 to 6 months11/9/87 Y K Ho, Lecturer, Baptist Coll.
SCMPHong Kong remains outstandingly cheap17/9/87 Duncan Mount, Managing Director
Gartmore Fund Managers ltd.
SCHPReporting some economists' views that the gt6at equity markets are21/9/87 Giselle Militante. SCMPCorresponder
about to crash
MPYear-end Index will at least be 4,00024/9/87 James Capel
SP4,200 expected for Year-end Hang Seng Inde,24/9/87 Duncan Mount, Managing Director
Gartmore Fund Managers ltd.
SCHPAny edjustments(in the market) Art slz u t'Y and will be followed28/9/87 Chin Tung Research
by further upward ones
Strong economic fundamentals will be reflected in the market s1/10/87 Alan Mearns, Fidelity International
1/10/87 Duncan Mount, Managing Director Year-end Index ti•ll at least be 4,000 and target for mid-1988 is 5,001 SP
Gartmore Fund Managers ltd.
1/10/87 Chin Tung Research The market to break-through 4,000 to the short-term SP
1/10/87 Crosby Securities 4,700- 4,800 expected on the Hong Sens index SP
7/10/87 PauL Terry, Chairman of Monitor Money The Hang Seng Index to peak at 5,000 to 6,000 by the end of 198 SOU
11/10/87 Christopher Cheong. James Capet The Hong Kong market to rise to 14,000 on the Hang Seng Index In the SP
next 5 years
19/10/87 Russell G Todd, Cotumists The US market dive aroused concern in the Asian markets A.'SJ
19/10/87 Hong Kong Shanghai Banking Fast credit expansion seen as a concern for the stock market HSBC
M A MP CT7MP TMH17V
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We are therefore of the view that investors had not
been adequately or clearly forewarned of the Crash. In
any event, we are convinced that even had there been
clearer warning signals, they could well have been
ignored. The reason is that big institutional investors
in particular, had been convinced that the Hong Kong
economy was strong and healthy before the Crash. They
probably believed that only political factors in Hong Kong
could cause a significant downturn of the market. This was
borne out by the fact that since mid-1986, when the bull
market emerged, the Hong Kong market had only had two
corrections which recorded a fall of more than 10% (Chart
3.1) and both were caused by events with political
overtones:
(a) In mid-January 1987 when Hu Yaobang was sacked
from the position of Secretary General of the Chinese
Communist Party, the market was terrified of a
backlash on the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong
(b) From early March to late April 1987 when there
were rumours that several major companies including
Jardine and Cheung Kong were going to issue B shares,
the market interpreted such a move as a lack of
confidence in the future of Honq Kong.
Therefore the popular view in the market, at most,
was that any forthcoming correction would be moderate
15
given the absence of negative political developments.
Test of Market Crash Predictability
The article by Avner Arbel, Steven Carvel and Erik
Postneiks, "The Smart Crash of October 19th", suggested
that in the US stock market context, the Graham Formula
could be used to predict a stock market crash. We are
sceptical about this and we therefore wish to test whether
or not the Formula could have predicted the Crash in Hong
Kong in October 1987.
Data Base
We used the share price data for all 33 constituent
shares of the Hang Seng Index.
Data Source
Our sources of data are from SBCI Securities (Asia
Limited, Wardley cards published by Wardley Data Services
Limited, the Securities Bulletin published by the Stock
Exchange of Hong Kong Limited, Hong Kong Economic Journal
Monthly, company research reports published by Vickers da
Costa Hong Kong Limited, Sun Hung Kai Research Limited,
Baring Securities (Hong Kong) Limited, publications from





The objective of this chapter is to test whether or
not the Graham Formula could have predicted the stock
market crash in Hong Kong in October 1987.
Theoretical Framework
The Graham Formula was developed by Benjamin Graham in
1962 and revised in 1974. On the basis of a few
company-specific and market fundamental factors such as
current earnings per share, projected long term profit
growth, the underlying 'appropriate' earnings yield, and
interest rate expectations as captured by the yield on AAA
corporate bonds, the Formula produces a Graham value which
represents the 'Intrinsic Value' (Vj) of the shares. The
Formula is shown below:
Vj= EPSj (8.5+ 2Gj)* 4.4/ Yaaa
where EPSj= the company's earnings per share
in the past 12 months
Yaaa= the prevailing yield on AAA
corporate bonds
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The constant, 8.5, represents the 'appropriate' price
earnings multiple for a no-growth company as proposed by
Benjamin Graham. The yield of high grade corporate bonds
in 1962, which was 4.4%, was incorporated in the last
expression of the Formula as an adjustment factor for the
interest rate changes.
A Relative Graham Value (RGV) can be derived by
dividing the Graham Value by the market price of that
particular share. It can be expressed in a mathematical
form as follows:
RGVj= Vj/ Pi
where Pi= Price of Stock j
An RGV greater than one indicates that the share is
undervalued and RGV smaller than one implies that it is
overvalued.
Application of the Graham Formula in the US Market
Arbel, Carvell and Postneiks suggested in their
article entitled 'The Smart Crash of October 1987' that an
RGV derived from the Graham Formula predicts an impending
crash when it is much smaller than one, meaning that the
shares in the market are substantially over-valued. The
exact value of the RGV or the exact percentage of market
over-valuation that predicts an impending crash was not
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mentioned, but it was indicated in the article that when
the US market was over-valued by 17% in September 1987, a
crash indeed happened in the following month of October
1987. For ease of reference, we summarize their findings
to derive the Graham Value and Relative Graham Value of
the New York stock market a year before, right before and
right after the October Crash in Table 4.1.
TABLE 4. 1
APPLICATION OF THE GRAHAM FORMULA TO THE
US STOCK MARKET
RelativeAAA
l Bond i Graham i Graham Over-Valued/AveragE Projected





The above figures indicated that the US market was
about 19% undervalued as at the end of 1986, 17%
overvalued as at the end of September 1987 and 4%
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undervalued right after the severe drop on 19th October,
1987. The large amount of over-valuation in September
1987 was taken to signify that a Crash was impending. A
crash did turn out to take place in October 1987 causing a
market correction as expected. The market returned to a
level close to its intrinsic value.
Arbel, Carvell and Postnieks also computed the
Relative Graham Value for 39 leading US corporations in
several industries. The Graham Formula predicted a
post-crash average price of $40.80 for the entire group.
The actual price was $40.60. To Arbel, Carvell and
Postniiks, that the Formula worked so well in accurately
predicting the share price drop for leading companies
reflected that the Graham Formula is a "down-to-earth
valuation approach that focuses on the key market-related
and company-specific variables." They concluded that "at
the very early stages of the Crash, investors adopted a
basic, no-nonsense valuation approach. Amazingly, the
resulting pricing mechanism can be captured, to a large
extent. by Graham's Formula."
We shall examine in the following sections whether the
Graham Formula could have predicted the crash in the
context of the Hong Kong stock market.
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Application of the Graham Formula
in the Hong Kong Market
Methodology
We apply the Graham Formula to the Hang Seng Index to
determine the Hong Kong market's intrinsic value as at the
end of each month since October 1986 through October
1987. The Relative Graham Value of the market is also
calculated on the same basis. With a view to monitoring
the figures more closely on trading days immediately
before the Crash, daily figures are calculated for October
1987.
When we apply the Formula, we have to modify it
slightly because Hong Kong does not have an active
corporate bond market, and hence it is extremely
difficult, if not impossible, to establish an appropriate
bond yield for the interest rate adjustment factor in the
Formula. We therefore use the 12 month Hong Kong dollar
deposit rate as a proxy for our calculations.
The modified Graham Formula and the correspondingly
modified formula for calculating RGV of the Hang Seng
Index are listed below. They produce respectively a) the
aggregated Graham Value of the Hang Seng Index's 33
21
constituent stocks weighted by their market capitalisation
and b) the Relative Graham Value of the Hang Seng Index.
a. Vmi= (Pj i (8.5+2Gj) *4 .4/TMDR) *HXi/Mhi
Where Vmi= Graham Value for the market at time i
Pji= Total Profit of stock j at time i
Gj= Long-term earnings growth of stock j
TMDR= Hong Kong Dollar 12 month deposit rate
HXi= Hang Seng Index at time i
Mhi= Total Market Capitalisation of Hang Seng
Index at time i
AND
b. RGVmi= Vmi/ HXi
Where RGVmi is the Relative Graham Value of the Hang
Seng Index.
The Graham Value and Relative Graham Value of the 33
individual Hang Seng constituent stocks are similarly
calculated for two distinct days, 1st October 1987 and
26th October, 1987. The purpose is to a) compare over-
valuation or under-valuation of individual stocks in the
period under review and b) examine whether the post-crash




Tables 4.2 to 4.4 below show the results of applying
the Graham Formula to the Hong Kong market in the year
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GRAHAM VALUES AND RGVS. OF THE
INDIVIDUAL CONSTITUENT STOCKS
OF THE HANG SENG INDEX
1st October 1987 26th October 1987
Graham Graham
Stock Price Value RGV Price Value RGV
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Bank of East Asia 34.50 12.25 0.3E 20.00 12.36 0.62
Cathay Pacific 8.70 6.76 o. 7E 5.25 6.93 1.32
Cavendish 5.40 2.79 0.52 2.85 2.90 1.02
Cheung Kong 13.80 7.32 0.53 8.00 7.40 0.93
China Light Power 30.00 16.38 0.55 16.60 16.48 0.99
Dairy Farm 6.45 2.99 0.46 3.70 3.04 0.82
Green Island Cement* N/A N/A N/ N/A N/A NI
Hang Lung 10.00 5.91 0.59 3.65 5.95 1.63
Hang Seng Bank 51.00 21.36 0.42 30.00 21.59 0.72
Henderson Land 8.55 4.96 0.58 3.45 5.10 1.48
HK Air. Engineering 17.20 8.73 0.51 9.35 8.82 0.94
HK Electric 11.10 6.95 0.63 7.00 6.92 0.99
HK China Gas 6.43 0.2921.80 12.50 6.54 0.52
HK Land 9.20 4.13 0.45 7.30 4.17 0.57
HK Realty A 7.05 6.30 0.89 4.00 6.35 1.59
Hongkong Bank 10.90 6.97 0.64 7.40 7.03 0.95
65.50 22.52 0.34HK Shanghai Hotels 31.00 22.72 0.73
18.00 4.77 0.26HK Telephone 10.30 4.83 0.47
16.60 8.90 0.54 10.20HK-TVB 9.02 0.88
Hutchison Whampao 15.90 6.09 0.38 8.15 6.14 0.75
0.66 0.441.49 0.80 0.66 0.83Hysan Development
23.20 13.71 0.59 11.50Jardine Matheson 14.06 1.22
13.90Jardine St. Holdings 8.21 0.59 8.25 8.21 1.00
Kowtocn Motor Bus 14.10 7.02 0.50 9.10 7.13 0.78
6.35 3.48 0.55Mandarin Oriental 3.75 3.58 0.95
9.30 2.10 0.23 6.30Miramar Hotels 2.08 0.33
8.07 0.51 8.19 1.16New World Development 15.70 7.05
20.00 10.92 0.55Sun Hung Kai Prop. 11.13 1.139.85
28.40Swire Pccific A 14.03 0.49 14.20 14.25 1.00
5.30 5.37 1.01Tai Cheung Prop. 2.40 5.52 2.30
11.20 5.22 0.47 6.15 5.27 0.86Wharf Holdings
15.90 17.90 1.13 9.70 18.09 1.86Winsor Industrial
5.20 2.66 0.51 2.30 2.72 1.18World International
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -




Table 4.2 shows that the Hong Kong stock market was
over-valued by 22.2% even in October 1986, a full year
before the global stock market crash. Table 4.3 shows that
when the Hang Seng Index recorded its historic high of
3949.7 on 1st October, 1987, the Relative Graham Value of
the market stood at 0.528, meaning a 47.2% over-valuation.
Share prices gradually dropped between the period from 1st
October to 19th October, 1987, but the Relative Graham
Value of 0.527 at the close of business on Black Monday
suggests that the market was still over-valued by as much
as 47.3%. Table 4.4 shows that individual stocks were also
generally over-priced on 1st October, 1987. For example the
shares of Miramar Hotels on that day had a Relative Graham
Value of 0.23, suggesting an over-valuation of as much as
0
77%.
The significant price drop on 19th October, 1987
coupled with the pent-up selling following the 4 days'
closure of the stock exchange then sent the Hang Seng Index
down to 2,241.7 at the close of trading on 26th October,
1987, as indicated in Table 4.3. The Relative Graham Value
rose to 0.958, suggesting that the degree of over-valuation
had dropped to a modest and more realistic 4.2%. Despite
strong intra-day rebounds on the following two days in
response to interest rate cuts, the Hang Seng Index failed
to regain any sustainable upward momentum after the Crash
and the Graham Value of the Hang Seng Index at 2184.7 was
extremely close to the actual Index of 2204.5
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on 29th October when the Relative Graham Value only
indicated a 0.9% over-valuation.
Interpretation
Although the Hong Kong market differs quite
significantly from the United States market in terms of
pre-crash over-valuation, the Graham Formula has shown to
have worked equally well in both of the markets in
predicting their post-crash support levels. The Hong Kong
market almost rested exactly at the theoretical 'intrinsic
value' level of the Hang Seng Index, as did the United
States market.
However, we do not feel that this is a good enough
method of predicting market crashes. As seen in Table 4.2
the Hong Kong market was over-valued by as much as 22.2%
back in October 1986, and yet it did not crash then. For
comparison, it is noteworthy that the actual crash on
Black Monday was in fact a crash of 11% in magnitude.
Hence we argue that the Graham Formula is only useful in
predicting a crash to the extent that it gives warning
signals when the market or an individual share is
grossly over-valued. But because the size of over-
valuation is not defined, the Formula can give no
indication of when exactly the crash is going to take
place even if we calculate daily RGVs. This is a severe
shortcominq of the Formula.
28
Three other shortcomings that we have identified are:-
Variation in long-term earnings growth forecast
The long-term earnings growth forecast (Gj) is a
component in the Graham Formula. Accuracy of this
forecast depends on the following factors:-
a) Availability of information of the market/stocks
b) Number of analysts following the market/stocks
c) Size of the market/stocks
d) Length of the period of forecast
We are of the view that factors a), b) and c) may be
interrelated. If we assume that bigger companies release
more information and that more analysts follow them, then
the relationship between the companies' size and the
accuracy of the profit growth forecasts under different
time periods should follow the pattern depicted in Graph
4.1: the bigger the company and the shorter the time
period, the more accurate the forecast.
We may therefore argue that the Graham Formula values
markets or stocks more accurately when it is applied to:
a) larger markets or larger companies, and b) shorter
length of forecast period, which give a more accurate Gj.
GRAPH 4.1
VARIATIONS OF PROFIT FORECASTS BY
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This means that the Graham Formula can be a more
useful tool in predicting the intrinsic value of developed
and sizable markets as well as the stocks which have a
large market capitalisation The accuracy of valuing a
smaller market such as Hong Kong's may be inferior to that
for the US or Japanese markets.
Validity of a Fixed Multiple of 8.5x
for a Zero-Growth Company
The fixed earnings multiple of 8.5x for a zero-growth
company used in the Graham Formula is not supported by
more formal theories in finance. As the long-term bond
yield was an average of 4.4% in 1962 when Benjamin Graham
developed the Formula, it seems to us that an
'appropriate' earnings multiple for a zero-growth company
of 8.5x appears rather inconsistent and arbitrary. We
have derived two hypothetical examples to indicate the
defects of Graham's choice of 8.5x.
Example one. An investor in 1962 commanded a
long-term bond return of 4.4% in 1962. As this is a
long-term debt instrument, say 30 years, the return is
fixed once the purchase is done (ie the yield is
zero-arowth over the long-term). If the investor put
31
10,000 into the long-term bond in 1962, the annual
interest payment receivable was US$440, assuming that
there was no withholding tax on bond interest dividend.
The present value of this 30-year bond is therefore
D30MbD2Vb Dl
l+ r) 30
(1+ r) 2(i +r) 1
Where Vb= Value of the Bond
Di= Interest Payment (where i=1 to 30)
Mb= Principal Repayment upon Maturity
r= Market Discount Rate
In this case, we may quite simply assume the bond
yield is equivalent to the market discount rate. From
Appendix 2 we arrive the present value of the bond at
$10,000.
Example two. If however the investor put his money
into a zero-growth share which constantly derived a fixed
earnings per share at an earning multiple of 8.5x, the
following calculation would show a rather interesting
scenario:-
The investor purchased 1,000 shares at US$10 each,
representing an earnings multiple of 8.5x ie EPS is
32
1.1765 (Appendix 3). Since the company is not obliged to
pay out 100% of the earnings, and pay-out the entire
profit is rather unusual, we assume that the company
adopts a 65% dividend pay-out ratio. For a no-growth
company, capital expenditure and working capital
requirements should be much smaller than those dynamic
growth companies and we consider that such a dividend
pay-out ratio would be realistic. We further assume that
the company will voluntarily liquidate 30 years later for
the sake of making a meaningful comparison with Example
one. Given these assumptions, we have arrived at the
present value of the stock as follows:
US$
12.60Sum of NPV of Dividend
3.39NPV of Undistributed Reserve
USSl6.0CPresent Value of the Stock
Investors would obviously favour the stock over the
bond. The appropriate earnings multiple of this stock
given that the prevailing market interest rate is 4.4% and
the company would not bankrupt should be:-
20.92US$16.0/ US$0.7647
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We however do not intend to establish our own
'appropriate' earnings multiple for a zero-growth
company. Instead, we wish to point out the fact that the
earnings multiple we derived in the last paragraph is a
function of a-number of factors:
a) Risk of Bankruptcy- Economic risk, industry risk and
operational risk
b) Political risk- A zero-growth company in the US
should be valued differently from say, its South
Korean counterpart
c) Risk Free Interest Rate of the economy in which the
company operates
d) Unique features of the company- finances such as
dividend policy, cashflow, quality of earnings etc.
Simply attaching a multiple to a no-growth company
therefore appears to be rather inappropriate.
Inaccuracy
According to the Graham Formula, shares will fall to
their intrinsic values when a crash occurs. This implied
that an under-valued market would never have occured. We
are dubious about this as markets always swing from one
extreme to another i.e. from over-valued to under-valued
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and back. We therefore are of the view that the Graham
Formula can at best be a good indicator of a downside
market or at worst a poor indicator which underestimates
the value of the market.
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CHAPTER V
AN ALTERNATIVE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK TO PREDICT
THE LONG TERM TREND OF THE HONG KONG STOCK MARKET
It is apparent from the findings in Chapter IV that the
Graham Formula is not good at predicting the timing of the
Crash in Hong Kong. The objective of this chapter is to
develop an alternative framework to predict the long term
trend of the Hong Kong stock market.
Performance of the Hong Kong Stock Market since 1964
We start by examining the historical pattern of the
Hong Kong market as captured by the Hang Seng Index since
it was first established by the Hang Seng Index Service
Limited in 1964.
The Hang Seng Index when first published in November
1964 had a base value of 100. In January 1984 sectorial
indices were introduced in order to better reflect the
share price performance of different market sectors and the
base was changed accordingly. We would say that the Hang
Seng Index is a good indicator of the performance of the
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Hong Kong market as its 33 constituent stocks normally
account for over 75% of the value of the market.
Chart 5.1 sets out the performance of the Hang Seng
Index since its inception in 1964. We can find that there
were four significant downturns in the market respectively
in 1967, 1973, 1982 and 1987. We go through these major
crashes one by one.
1. The Hong Kong market was first driven down to a low
of 58.61 in August 1967 in response to the local
political unrest as an echo to the Cultural Revolution
in Mainland China at that time. After that period, the
market began to take off when exports boomed and the
wealth of Hong Kong increased rapidly. The prosperous
external trade fuelled demand for properties for the
first time in the history of Hong Kong during that
period.
2. The second crash came in 1973 when the Hang Seng
Index plummeted from its peak of 1770.85 in March 1973
to 150.11 in December 1984, registering a loss of 90%
in market value. The market which had been fuelled by
investors' out-of-control herd instinct suddenly
collapsed when investors were shocked by the unexpected
oil-crisis which quadrupled petroleum prices.
CHART 5.1
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3. From 1975 to 1979 the Hong Kong stock market
experienced a relatively lengthy period of sluggishness
as investors had not recovered from the losses they had
incurred in the 1973 collapse. The real economy,
however, was doing extremely well in the late 1970s.
An export-led economic boom occurred again, which
fuelled the craze in the property market. The
ill-considered rent-control in 1979 together with the
pent-up demand from people with rising real income sent
property prices to an all-time-high in 1980-81. The
stock market responded accordingly. Another crucial
factor for the stock market's strength at that time was
the much larger participation of foreign institutions.
Under these circumstances, the Hang Seng Index
eventually broke its high in 1973 to peak at 1810.20 in
July 1981.
4. The third crash came in 1982. With the recession in
the United States triggered by their then President
Ronald Reagan's tight monetary policy, the over-supply
in the local property market and the confidence
shake-up resultant from the British Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher's visit to Beijing in September 1982,
the over-heated stock market finally suffered from a
severe correction that caused the market to lose about
60% of its value at one stage. Many property companies
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had gone bust and earnings of listed companies
generally fell.
5. In October 1987 the market lost more that 50% of its
value. Before that the market had been doing very well
due to the clearer political outlook, steeply
accelerating export activities resultant from the weak
US dollar to which the Hong Kong dollar is linked,
revival in the property market and the continuous
open-door policy in China. The boom ended as the
concerns over the twin deficits in the US, the
tightening of global liquidity and a nose-diving
greenback led other major markets to collapse on the
'Black Monday' on 19th October, 1987.
From our examination of the past performance of the
Hong Kong stock market, we cannot find any discernible
pattern of peaks and crashes which can be used as a basiE
for predictions of the market behaviour in future.
Alternative Analytical Framework
We next turn to commonly used finance theories to help
us examine in depth the past performance of the stock
market. The Hang Seng Index is, afterall, an aggregate
indicator of its individual constituent companies. We
therefore look for possible methods to measure the value of
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a company. We appreciate that we should only settle for
methods that are simple and easy to understand so that all
market participants will be able to use them.
We found two commonly used methods in finance theory to
measure the value of a company.
The first method is to examine the future earnings of a
company and the risks associated with such earnings. The
price earnings ratio ("PER") which measures a company's
future earnings and risks, is a commonly used financial
statistic to represent the overall rating of a company. The
value of a company can be calculated by multiplying its
earnings by its expected PER.
The second method is to examine the future income to be
received by its shareholders discounted to its present
value. The value of a company can be computed by dividing
its forecast dividend payment by its expected dividend
vi Plrl-
We consider that either PER or dividend yield can be
used as indicators in measuring the value of the stock
market which is made up of individual companies. We
therefore examine the Hong Kong market with particular
reference to the market's PER and yield as set out below:
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(a) The Price-Earnings Ratio Band
The market PER is computed by dividing the total
capitalisation of all the shares traded in the market by
the earnings of those shares. The Hang Seng Index's PER is
used as a proxy to the market PER.
The PER of Hang Seng Index (PERHSIX) is computed by
dividing the Hang Seng Index by an adjusted aggregate
earnings for the constituent stocks of the Hang Seng Index
for calendar years which is set out as follows:
MCHSIXjHSIXjPij
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company's actual operating conditions. However, for the
sake of consistency and convenience, such a procedure has
been adopted as a proxy.
Chart 5.2 (produced by SBCI) shows 4 curves
representing the calculated theoretical values of the Hang
Seng Index based on the historical aggregate earnings and
price earnings multiple of 7, 10, 15 and 20 times. Each
point on the same curve indicates the same earnings
multiple on the Hang Seng Index. From the chart, we can see
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(b) The Yield Band
The tabulation of the Yield Band is similar to that of
the PER Band as shown above except that the profits of Hang
Seng Index's constituent stocks are replaced by their
dividends. The yield of the Hang Seng Index (YIELDHSIX) is
computed by dividing the Hang Seng Index by the adjusted
aggregate annual dividend payment of the constituent stocks
using the following formula:
MCHSIXjHSIXjDijYIELDHSIX
Where Dij = Dividend of company i in calendar year j
HSIXj = Hang Seng Index at year-end of calendar
year j
MCHSIXj = Hang Seng Index's market capitalisation
as at year end of calendar year j
We also reproduce another chart prepared by SBCI
(Chart 5.3) : the five yield curves shown represent 2%, 3%,
4%, 6% and 8% respectively. We can see that the yields of
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From Chart 5.2, we can see that the market's highest
earnings multiple was recorded on 5th March, 1973 when the
Index peaked at 1770.85. The multiple by then was over 85
times. The market reached its lowest at about 7 times PER
for three times: at around the time of the 1967 riot, the
visit by Margaret Thatcher to Beijing in September 1982 and
the collapse of the Hong Kong dollar during the
Sino-British negotiation in September 1983. There was
another fall of the market to an earnings multiple of only
about 8 times in mid-1984 when the United Kingdom Foreign
Secretary Geoffery Howe announced that the British
Government would cease to rule Hong Kong after 1 July, 1997
and coincidentally Deng Xiaopeng said that the PRC planned
to station troops in Hong Kong after the PRC resumes its
sovereignty over Hong Kong.
The above observations suggest that except under
political crises, the Hong Kong market had never traded at
below 10 times time-apportioned earnings. Political unrest
or confidence crises had sent the market down to roughly
about 7 times earnings but the market had rebounded
relatively quickly from that level.
We consider the boom in 1973 a variant because at that
time the Hong Kong stock market was still an undeveloped,
premature and small market in which small unprofessional
investors dominated. The Hong Kong market in 1973 is
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comparable to the present Taiwan market as both of them
ignored fundamentals of the listed companies and their
earnings potential. Share prices had simply been supported
by speculation and rumours. This sort of market rating is
not expected to happen again in the Hong Kong market as it
has now become an international, regulated and
sophisticated market with a significant proportion of
participants who are professionals.
Therefore apart from the aforementioned extreme cases,
we conclude that the Hong Kong market had normally traded
in between 10 to 20 times of its earnings. When economic
conditions were relatively gloomy or economic uncertainties
prevailed, the market had traded at the range of 10 times
of its earnings. When the economy had performed
exceptionally strong and investors were very optimistic,
the market had traded at above 15 times of its earnings.
However, preceding the collapse in 1981 and the Crash
in 1987, the market had traded at a high of 20 times its
multiple. On the basis of past trading pattern, it is
quite evident that the market cannot trade at such a
multiple.
We accordingly recommend that as an analytical
framework to measure the long term trend of the Hong Kong
stock market, prudent investors should be extremely
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cautious whenever the Hong Kong market trades at near 20
times of its earnings. Whenever the market appears to bE
so over-valued, it should be taken that a crash should
immediately follow.
Similarly from Chart 5.3, we observe that the market
normally bottoms out at 7% dividend yield and peaks at
2.5%. We accordingly also recommend that the lower limit of





We have examined several methods of giving warnings to
investors about an impending stock market crash. We are
however of the view that none can in fact predict with
much certainty the exact timing of a crash.
Predicting a market crash requires knowledge of the
unanimous decision of all investors about what the future
would bring to bear on the market. If all investors decide
that the future appeared to bring doom to the market, then
all would sell their shares at the same next available
opportunity so that a crash would follow. But this is
practically impossible for a single piece of mathematical
formula or computer software to capture because the minds
of individuals are bound to be independent. While if given
sufficient market information and feeling of the pulse of
the market, the decisions of a proportion of major players
could be predicted but the remaining investors, even if
predicted to be followers, could still only be expected to
follow after a time lag. This would at best mean a
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prediction of a crash drawn out over a period of time; a
method to predict a crash of the magnitude of the one on




We have been inspired by tests done in the US
stock market (Arbell, Carvell and Postneiks) to perform
similar tests in the Hong Kong stock market. The overal:
conclusion of both parts of our study is that investors
had behaved rationally during the chaos of the October
Crash in 1987.
This conclusion is the same as that drawn for the US
market. This is significant because the Hong Kong and the
US markets differ in many respects.
The Hong Kong market with a market capitalization of
US$54 billion as at December 1987, ranks only twelfth when
compared with the world's major equity markets. The US
(New York) market is much larger, US$2132 billion in terms
of market capitalization and ranks second only after the
Tokyo market (Appendix 4)..
Hong Kong by comparison is a small economy with a
relatively small pool of domestic savings available for
investment and few companies suitable for listing. Only
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narrow range of business are represented on the Hong Kong
Stock Exchange and they are predominantly property and
finance companies (Appendix 5). Few foreign companies are
listed. Furthermore, by comparison with the fair and
orderly markets in the US, the Hong. Kong market has
inadequate supervision and regulation. Coupled with the
political uncertainties unique to Hong Kong and the brain
drain problem as Chinese middle management leave the
territory, the Hong Kong and the US markets can be said to
be two vastly different markets.
That the investors had behaved in basically the same
risk averse and rational manner suggests that this
consideration is the top on all investors' minds;
irrespective of the structural differences in the market,
the decisions are ultimately made by people.
APPENDIX 1
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RELATIVE GRAHAMVALUE APPENDIX 1 (CONT'D)














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Valuation of the 30 Year Bond with a 4.4% Yield
Interest Discounted
Year Principal Payment Interest
0 10000.0
1 440. C 421.E
2 4 4 0. C 403.7
3 440. C 386.7
4 440. C 370.4
5 440. C 354.8
6 44O.C 339.8
7 440. C 325.5
8 440. C 311.8
9 440. C 298.6
10 440. C 286.1
11 440. C 274.0
12 44O.C 262.5
13 44O.C 251.4





















NET PRESENT VALUE OF THE STOCK
IN EXAMPLE TWO
DiscoantdMarket t Earnings Dividended Undistributed


































3.39IPV of Undistributed Reserve
APPENDIX 4'.
COMPARISON OF WORLD'S MAJOR EQUITY MARKETS
(as at end December 1987)


































































































Source : FIBV International Statistics
(1) These figures include a number of exchanges.
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APPENDIX 5
THE STOCK EXCHANGE OF HONG KONG
















PART ONE RESEARCH STRATEGY AND METHODOLOGY
Part one of our study is to test whether investors in
Hong Kong behaved rationally with respect to their
investment decisions during the critical and apparently
chaotic situation in the October 1987 Crash.
The Chaos during the Crash
Although the Hang Seng Index already started to move
down after it had touched its historic high of 3968 on 1st
October, 1987, the real Crash in the Hong Kong market
started only on the 19th October, 1987. Chart 3.1 sets out
the movements of the Hang Seng Index and the daily
turnover during September and October 1987.
Despite the strong trend building up the market for
more than a year, the market suddenly lost all its suppor
over those critical moments on 19th October, 1987. The
high turnover against the background of substantial loss
in value suggested that investors were trying every
possible way to get rid of their shares. With so much
anic selling in such a short period of time, it almost
CHART 3.1












































appeared that all rationality had been lost. Our study is
to examine whether investors in Hong Kong had been making
their investment decisions rationally during that period.
Tests of Stock Market Rationality
Taking into consideration the findings in the United
States market in the article The Smart Crash of October
19th, we assume that the market in Hong Kong would behave
as follows if all investors had made their decisions
rationally:-
(a) Pre-Crash Price Gains
Shares that had gone up most before the Crash_
should come down most during the Crash (Chapter
IV).
(b) Industry Characteristics
Shares of industries which had high quality
earnings should fall the least (Chapter V)
(c) Special Situation shares
Shares of companies which had been involved in
Special Situations like corporate
restructuring, share placing and takeover before
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and during the Crash should lose more than the
overall market (Chapter VI)
(d) Risk Averse Logic
Shares of companies having the following
characteristics should fall the most:-
i. high gearing
high price earnings multiplesii.
iii. low dividend yield'
small market capitalisationiv.
high price to book value orV.
high beta valuevi.
(Chapter VII)
Details of the methodology for specific tests are
elaborated in each Chapter.
Data Base
There were 272 public companies listed in the nong
Kong Stock Exchange as at the end of September 1987. The
272 companies had a total market capitalisation of HK$
755.8 billion as at 30th September,1987.
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Data Source
Our sources of data are from SBCI Securities (Asia)
Limited, Wardleycards published by. Wardley Data Services
Limited, the Securities Bulletin published by the Stock
Exchange of Hong Kong Limited, Hong Kong Economic Journal
Monthly, company research reports published by Vickers da
Costa Hong Kong Limited, Sun Hung Kai Research Limited,
Baring Securities (Hong Kong) Limited, publications from





The objective of this chapter is to examine the
relationship between the price gain prior to the Crash and
the price drop during the Crash in Hong Kong.
Theoretical Framework
Under a bull market environment, investors are always
optimistic-in assessing a company's value and acquire
shares at prices which bear no relatyon to a company's
fundamentals. Such unfound optimism and the corresponding
increase of share prices develop into a vicious cycle with
one chasing the other. According to Benjamin Graham, the
father of fundamental value analysis, this is
characteristic of all bull markets.
Such a cycle will stop once investors lose their
optimism. Accordingly investors will dump their shares and
prices will be brought down in proportion to the extent of
overpricing that preceded the Crash. Shares therefore that




We examine the share price data of 263 companies
during the period from 10th February,1987, an arbitrary
date chosen in early 1987 to 7th December,1987, the day
when the Hang Seng Index reached its lowest at 1895 during
that year.
We define our Pre-crash Price Gain period from 10th
February,1987 to 1st October,1987, the day when the Hang
Seng Index peaked at 3968, the highest ever in the history
of Hong Kong. The period measuring the price drop would be
from 1st October, 1987 to 7th December, 1987.
The Pre-crash Price Gain and the Price Loss of each
company are calculated using the following equations:-
Pre-crash Price Gain(%)= (P2- Pl) *100%/Pl
Price Loss during the
Crash(%)= (P3- P2) *100%/P2
where P1= Closing share price@ 10.2.87.
P2= Closing share price@ 1.10.87
P3= Closing share price@ 7.12.87
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In order to show the relationship between the two
variables, companies are arranged in decending order of
their Pre-crash Price Gain. The list is then divided into
quintiles of 53 companies each for the first four
quintiles and 51 companies for the last quintile. The
average Price Gain before the Crash and the average Price
Loss during the Crash of each quintile are calculated and
tabulated for comparison.
We also run a correlation to test whether there is a
statistical relationship between the two variables.
To test whether the relationship between the two
variables are statistically significant, we further run a
regression analysis between Pre-crash Price Gain and Price
Loss during the Crash in the form of the equation as
follows:-
Constant.+ B* Pre-crash Price Gain+
Price Loss
Random Errorduring the Crash
In this analysis, we compute the r value
statistical significance between the two variables and a
significant F value of less than 0.005 is accepted as
statistically significant. We also compute a significant
T-va1ue which measures the significance of B. We accept
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a significant T value of absolute value of less than 0.005
as statistically sicnificant.
Results
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- 70.261550.00 to 134.62Highest1
- 55.28133.81 to 84.982
- 51.5784.40 to 51.163
- 54.4751.13 to 20.544













Constant (0. 0000)(Significant T)
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Interpretation
The shares in quintile one had the highest Pre-crash
Price Gains, ranging from 1550.00% to 134.62% and during
the Crash, their prices dropped by the largest magnitude,
-70.26%. This was.a larger drop than the average drop of
the entire market, which was approximately 52%.
The shares in quintile five had the lowest Pre-crash
Gains, ranging from 20.43% to even a price drop of -76.42%
and during the Crash, their prices only dropped by
-41.35%, the smallest in our quintile analysis.
Under a one-tailed test (significance level 0.001),
our correlation coefficient of -0.2755 is considered
statistically significant.
The above results are supported by the regression
analysis which shows a Significant F value of -0.000,
indicating a high degree of significance. This is further
supported by zero value Significant T on B.
Our results therefore confirm that there is a
relationship between the price gain prior to the Crash and
the price drop 'during the Crash: shares that had gone up




The objective of this chapter is to examine whether
there is any relationship between the characteristics of
an industry and the share price performance of that
industry during the Crash.
Theoretical Framework
Investors always have more confidence in shares of
industries which have high quality earnings i.e. stable
earnings which are not adversely affected during economic
downturns. These shares are always rated as a "long term
buy" and are rarely recommended as a "sell" candidate by
most professional stockbrokers. As a result, prices of
these shares fluctuate less and they weather crashes
remarkably well.
Shares of industries on basic necessities such as
utilities are considered to have high quality earnings.
This is distinct from industries which are more vulnerable
to an economic downturn such as properties and luxurious
goods:-their share prices tend to fluctuate more and are
likely to fall more during the Crash.
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Methodology
We choose the top 91 companies, in terms of their
market capitalisation, as the sample for our test.
We classify these companies into industry groups
according to their activities. Companies having more thar
one activity are classified according to their principal
activity which is measured in terms of attributable
profits. Table 5.1 sets out the industry classification:-
TABLE 5.1
CLASSIFICATION OF COMPANIES BY INDUSTRIES
No.of companiesCode Industry
4(1) Banking












No. of companiesCode Industry.
7(13) Hotels
2(14) Textile and Garment
9(15) Electronics
3(16) Retail and Department Stores
4(17) Food and Beverage
2(18) Entertainment and Movies
2(19) Airlines
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We examine the price data of these 91 shares during
the period from 10th February, 1987 to 7th December, 1987
The pre-crash period is defined as from 10th February,
1987 to 1st October, 1987 and the period of crash from 2nd
October, 1987 to 7th December, 1987. We calculate the
percentage price loss of each share during the Crash using
the following equation:-
Price Loss=( P2- P1)* 100% /P1
where P1= Closing price@ 1.10.87
P2= Closing price@ 7.12.87
The average drop in an industry is calculated by
taking the weighted average (using market capitalisation)
price drop of all companies in that industry using the
following equation:-











Our results are in Appendix 4. Table 5.2 sets out the
weighted average percentage share price loss of each
industry group during the Crash in descending order :-
TABLE 5.2












fall(%) during Crashcode Industry
-67.3112 Construction
-66.119 Trading
-65.122 Finance and Related














18 Entertainment and Movies
-48.92
14 Textile and Garment
-47.46










Investment Holding of code 3 fell the most during
the Crash, registering a 71.51% drop compared to the
average drop of approximately 52% of the entire market.
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The main reason why *this group fell the most is probably
because investors were not fully aware of the nature of
the investments held by those companies. Accordingly these
companies would be the first on the selling list when
there were uncertainties in the market.
Public Transportation of code 4 fell the least, only
41.60%. Communications of code 6 and Energy Utilities
of code 5 also only dropped by approximately 43%. These
three industry groups are all involved in basic
necessities and their activities are unlikely to be
adversely affected by the Crash.
In between these extremes, Construction of code 12
fell 67.31%. Investors probably considered that property
prices would drop following the Crash and this would have
an immediate impact on the activities in the construction
industry.
Banking of code 1 fell by only 45.17% was one of the
industry groups that were least hard-hit. The reason
probably was that most banks in Hong Kong only have local-
exposure and investors perceived it unlikely that the
local economy would be much adversely affected by the
Crash, hence the outlook of the banks' results remained
good. Accordingly the drop was relatively small.
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"Hotel" of code 13 and Aviation of code 19 did not
fall as much as expected. The reason is probably due to
the characteristics of these two industries in Hong Kong:
they rely on overseas visitors and tourists instead of
local people and the number of visitors to Hong Kong
remained all time high during the Crash.
our results tnere ore coniirm tnat mere is a
relationship between the characteristics of an industry
and the share price performance of that industry during
the Crash: shares of industries which had high quality
earnings had fallen the least during the Crash.
Limitations
Three out of our 19 industry groups are each
represented by one company only. We accept that the
performance of a single company might not be truly
representative' of the performance of that whole industry
group and furthermore, the share price of such one-company
industry group-might be affected by matters relevant only
to the one company. An example was that.news of the
proposed merger of The Hong Kong Telephone Co Ltd,- the
sole company in industry group 6 on communications, with
Cable and Wireless at that time could have affected the




The objective of this chapter is to examine whether or
not the fact that companies had been involved in special
situations like corporate restructuring before or during
the Crash bears any relationship with the magnitude of the
fall in price of the shares of these companies. The
shares of these companies are referred to as Special
Situation shares in this analysis.
Theoretical Framework
In a bull market, a company's share price tends to
move upwards ahead of its special situation
announcement. Although it may appear illogical, the
market always perceives that there is either value added
or release of hidden value in a company following the
completion of the transaction as announced. Accordingly
the share price of the company prior to the announcement
is always grossly under-estimated by the market.
Information of such nature is very price sensitive and
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oretically should be kept confidential. However, there is
always a small number of investors who can manage to get
hold of such information and trade accordingly. As a
result, the share prices of these companies tend to move
upwards much more quickly than the overall movement in the
market.
The three major types of "special situations" are-
(a) Placing
Placing of shares is one of the most popular ways
of raising capital from the market. While there
is always a lack of supply of shares (especially
in large quantity) in a bull market, placing is
most welcomed by investors as they can obtain
shares at a discount to the current trade price.
Since share prices tended to be pushed high by
the majority shareholders of companies which are
planning for a placing, share price of companies
which are planned for a placing would rise much
higher than the others.
(b) Share split
Although theoretically there woulu not be any
value added in splitting the shares of a company
into smaller denomination, a split would help to
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improve the liquidity of shares in the market. The
improvement in liquidity would help to generate
demand, particularly those derived from retail
investors, and as a result the shares are more likelj
to move up than down.
(c) Restructurinq and takeover
Restructuring is perceived positively by the
market because of possible value added after the
transaction. It is even more obvious in a
takeover situation whereby shareholder of a
target company would always benefit from the
difference between the offer price and the then
trading price. As a result, investors would pile
in companies which are the likely candidates for
restructuring or takeover and wait for the good
news.
Methodology
According to a report published by the Hong Kong
Economic Monthly (February,1988), there is a total of 59
companies which had announced plans that involved capital
raising, restructuring or had been subject to being taken
over during September and October,1987. Since the number
of companies involved is small, all the 59 companies
(totalling 72 transactions) are included in our study.
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Details of the transactions are set out in Appendix 5.
The price gain before the Crash and the price loss
during the Crash are computed for these special
situation shares using 2nd October,1987 as the dividing
line. We then compare the performance of these shares
with the overall market performance.
We also compare the price movement of all the 59
shares with the corresponding movement of the Hang Seng
Index during August, September and October 1987. The
movement of the 59 shares is computed using an index
comprising the market capitalisation of all the stocks:-
Pit* Nit/ TMtIndex (t)
where Pit= Price of share at time t
Mit= Market capitalisation of company
i at t
TMt= Market capitalisation of all
companies at t
Results
The results of the computation of the Pre-crash Price
Gain and Price Loss during the Crash are set out in full
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From the results in Table 6.1, we can see that before
the Crash, the special situation shares outperformed the
market their share prices went up 113.53% on average as
compared with 46.57% of the Hang Seng Index. On the other
hand, during the Crash they fell 60.13% on average, 8.11%
more than the Hang Seng Index.
Graph 6.1 shows that the special situation shares
had been out-performing the Hang Seng Index since August
1987 prior to the Crash and they had also lost more value
than the Index after the Crash.
From Appendix 5, it is worthwhile to note that of the
different kinds of special situation shares, those with
Share Splitting had the biggest price gain (average of
264.5%) while those grouped under Takeover had the
smallest gain (average of 46.6%). Although it appears that
the splitting of shares into smaller denomination is the
most efficient way to uncover hidden value, all the
companies involved had also been the subject of Placing
which might also have played an important part in pushing
up share prices.
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Another observation is that the size of most of these
companies involved in "special situations" are in fact
relatively small and their share prices have always been
subject to higher fluctuation than those of the bigger
companies.
Our results therefore confirm that the fact that
companies had been involved in "special situations" before
the Crash did bear a relationship with the magnitude of
the fall in price of the shares of these companies: the
prices of special situation shares fell more than the




The objective of this chapter is to examine
whether or not during the Crash, investors when
choosing which of their shares to sell had maintained
their rational behaviour by being basically, risk
averse.
Theoretical Framework
Share price is a reflection of investors'
perception of a company's value. According to
fundamental analysis, the value of a company is
determined by its earning potential and risk'
associated with such earnings and its net asset
backing. Under normal circumstances, investors will
sell shares which have a low earning potential, high
risk and low net asset backing.
There are three principal methods to measure the
val sic of a comtDanv.
First. We can determine the value of a company
by its earning potential. The earning potential is
90
calculated by using the discount cash flow concept
.whereby the company's value today is the discounted
value of its future earnings or dividends receivable
by its-'shareholders. Using historic or forecast
figures is a matter of the investors' preference in
estimating future income flows: historic figures give
certainty while forecasts may give a more realistic
picture.
Secondly, we can simply apply a multiple (price
earnings ratio PER) on its earnings or an expected
yield on its dividend to determine the value of the
company. A high price earnings ratio implies that
investors are either putting a high value on or
over-pricing the company's earnings. During the Crash,
it is almost certain that a high price earnings
multiple implies over-pricing.
Thirdly, we can determine the value of a company.
by-valuing its net assets.* This is a conservative way
of valuation because it looks at the break-up value of
a company. If the share price is trading at a premium
to assets, it implies either the investor is expecting
that the assets will appreciate in the future or over-
pricing-
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Any one of the three methods can be affected by
the risks associated with the operations of the
company. There are two kinds of measurable risks,
namely financial risk and market risk. Gearing is the
ratio between a company's borrowings and its net
tangible assets and is a good measure of the
financial risk of a company. BETA is a measure used by
professional investors to measure the market risk of a
share with respect to the overall market.
Methodology
We have selected the top 92 companies, in terms
of their market capitalisation, to perform the
following tests. Owing to data inavailability, some
tests have a smaller sample size.
We choose eight speciric variawiez:, tu VCV•
a) Historic dividend yield( DPS1/PRICE in
Appendix 8)
The historic dividend yield is computed by
dividing the company's latest announced
annual dividend per share by the share
price of the company as at 30th September,
1987. This statistic is used to measure the
historic income yield of the share.
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(b) Forecast dividend yield (DPS2/PRICE in
Appendix 8)
The forecast yield is computed by dividing
stockbrokers' estimate of a company's
annual dividend per share for the current
financial year by the share price as at
30th September,1987. Forecast yield is an
indicator of future income yielding of the
security of the share.
(c) Historic price earnings ratio (PRICE/EPS1
in Appendix 8)
Historic price earnings ratio (PER) is
computed by dividing a company's share
price as at 30th September,1987 by its
earnings per share in the previous
financial year. Earnings per share is
defined as profit after tax but before
extraordinary items divided by the number
of shares in issue during the year.
Historic PER is,used to measure the
relative rating of a company based on its
historic earnings.
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(d) Forecast price earnings ratio (PRICE/EPS
Forecast PER is based on stockbrokers'
estimate of a company's current year
earnings. Forecast PER gives a similar
measure as in (c) above but is based on
future earnings.
(e) Market capitalisation (PRICE* NO. OF SHARES
in Appendix 8)
This is computed by multiplying the share
price by the number of shares in issue as
at 30th September,1987. This is one of the
most commonly used statistics to measure
the size of a company and the liquidity of
its shares in the market.
(f) Premium (PRICE* NO. OF SHARES/ NET TANGIBLE
ASSETS N'I`A in Appendix 8)
This is computed by dividing the market
capitalisation as at the end of September
1987 by the company's net tangible assets
as at its previous year end date. Premium
is used to measure the extent the share




(g) Gearing (DEBT/ NTA in Appendix 8)
Gearing is computed by dividing a company's
long term debts (also net of its cash
balance, if appropriate) by its net
tangible assets as at its previous year end
date. Gearing is used to measure the
financial risk of the company in relation
to its long term borrowings.
(h) BETA( BETA in Appendix 8)
BETA is computed by the Hang Seng Index
Services Limited and is based on the
variation of the share price in relation to
the overall market movement. When a company
with BETA equals to one, its share price is
likely to be as volatile as the overall
market. If the BETA for a company is less
than one, its share price is less volatile
and if BETA is more than one, its share
price is more volatile than the market. To
a certain extent, BETA is only meaningful
if shares have sufficient liquidity so that
the share price movement is a genuine
reflection of the market.
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We perform a univariate analysis (Appendix 9) to
test the relationship between individual variables and
share price movement:-
Three tests were performed:-
i. Correlation analysis.
We divide each variable into quintiles.
Quintile one represents shares with the
highest value of the variable and quintile
five represents shares with the lowest
value of the same factor in question. Then
we run a correlation analysis to test
whether there is any significant
relationship between the-chosen variable
and the price movement of a share.
ii. Regression analysis.
A univariate regression analysis is
conducted to test whether the lineaz
relationship, as expressed below, is.
statistically significant.
Price movement= Constant+ b *Independent
Variable+ Random error
Pertinent statistical measures including
the significant F significant T, R-square
and standard error are calculated. A
significant T or significant F with
absolute value less than 0.05 is taken to
mean that the relationship is statistically
significant.
iii. Normalised analysis.
This test is conducted to examine which
independent variable(s) hashave more
effect on the price movement of shares. The
b value in the equation in (ii) above
measures the extent of impact of the
independent variable on price movement. In
order that the b value of different
independent variables is directly
comparable, we normalise the variables
using the following equation:
Z (X±) = ( x±- X ) V(X)
where Z(X) = normalised X
X = mean of x
V(X) = variance of x
We run the univariate analysis again and a
Z(b) is then used for comparing relative
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sinificancc amnnr inaonanAAnt variah1Pc_
Results
The results are in the Appendices 10 to 17. The
summary is set out in Table 7.1.
TAttT.F 7 :
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Amongst the eight variables that we tested, two
are found to have significant relationship to share
price movement during the Crash. They are Market
Capitalisation and BETA.-
(a) Market Capitalisation (Mkt in Table 7.1)
The test by quintile clearly shows the positive
relationship between the size of a company as
represented by market capitalisation and the price
movement. Shares of large companies with 'xigh
capitalisation lost 54.4% as compared to small
companies which lost 65.0%. The F-statistic of 0.009
confirms the strength of this univariate relationship
and a significant T of 0.009 reaffirms the existence
of such a relationship.
The existence of a positive relationship between
market capitalisation and price movement-means that
the smaller the market capitalisation of a company,
the more its share price would fall. This reflects
investors' worry of a forthcoming recession,.
especially when the crash was a global event. As
large companies are expected to be able to weather an
economic recession better than small companies,
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prudent and rational investors have understandably
chosen to sell securities of companies of smaller
size.
Moreover, shares of small companies with low
market capitalisation are also relatively thinly
traded as compared to those of large companies. Under
the condition where the buyer market of these low
capitalisation shares is relatively smaller i.e. lower
chance of liquidity, rational investors have again
understandably chosen to sell these shares first, thus
further accentuating the price decline of these
shares.
(b) Dividend yield (Yields in Table 7.1)
Dividend yield has also been proven to play a
strong role during the sell-off in the crash. Shares
with high yields lost only 55.3%, compared with
low-dividend yield shares which lost 64.9%. This
relationship is also statistically significant with an
F-value of 0.000. With B equals to 378.3 and the
significant T on B is 0.000, it implies the existence
of a positive relationship between the two variables.
Although the fundamental approach in diviaena
valuation in sell-off is controversial as investors in
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Hong Kong have a high tendency of looking for capital
growth rather than income, this has proven to hold at
a time when the market is unstable. This might also
imply that during time of uncertainty, investors tend
to hold investment which has a relatively high yield.
Also they tend to make their decision on the basis of
historic rather than forecast figures.
(c) Beta (Beta in Table 7.1)
The beta as a long-term indicator to predict a
company's market-related risk stands all of our
tests. A share with a high beta value is expected to
crash more than one which has a low beta. This
relationship is obvious from our quintile analysis.
Shares of high beta value lost 59.7% as compared with
shares of low beta value which lost 46%.
Statistically this relationship is significant as
indicated by an F-value of 0.001. At the same time, a
Significant-T of 0.001 also suggests the existence of
a negative relationship between the two variables.
once again this shows that prudent and rationa
investors have chosen to sell high risk shares in an
unsettling market and this holds true.even in this




Other variables including historic and forecast
Price Earnings Ratio ("PEl" and "PE2"), premium, gear,
and historic yield ("Yield2"), however, did not stand
the test of significance as they all have significant
F of greater than 0.1. This means that the share price
drop during the Crash did not have any relationship
with the above mentioned "fundamental" variables. We
suggest the following explanations:-
i.PE1 and PE2
Before the Crash, the price earnings ratio of
shares had reached a record high which implies that
the earnings yield are very low. The yields were in
fact much lower than the prevailing interest rate and
the shares were significantly overvalued. We
therefore understand that rational investors would
choose to sell shares with a high P/E. However,'
neither our quintile analysis nor regression analysis
could prove this.
The reason that price earnings ratios did not
have a significant relationship to price movement
during the Crash was probably due to the inaccuracy of
the profit figures. The historic earnings were
approximately ten months out of date and the forecast
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earnings might well be wrongly estimated as many
companies' earnings were derived from their treasury
management.
ii. Premium
Underlying asset value was expected to be highly
regarded by rational and conservative investor.
Accordingly shares with high premium (those having low
underlying asset value) are expected to be sold off
hence accentuating the price decline. However, this
relationship did not hold in the Hong Kong market.
The underlying reason to the test results might
probably be due to the grossly undervalued book value
of the shares. Many companies hold assets such as
properties which are based on historical data and
hence are not accurate and representative figures.
Moreover, another limitation comes in by the fact that
earnings of many companies are based on intangible
assets instead of tangible assets which cannot be
quantified.
iii. Geaz
The main reason that Gear appears to have no
relationship with share price is investors were fully
aware that the interest rate would be kept low during
the Crash. With a good underlying economy with low
interest rate, it is not surprised that gear has no
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such relationship. Another reason is probably due to
the misinterpretation of a company's borrowings as
many companies had been.borrowing out of their balance
sheets.
We feel that these are valid explanations.
Therefore in all we conclude that during the Crash,
investors when choosing which of their shares to sell,





The results of the preceding four chapters generally
lend support to our conclusion that the Hong Kong
investors had been making their investment decisions
rationally during the stock market Crash in 1987.
We are not surprised by this conclusion. We have
agreed with the generally held view that the Crash was led
by events in the United States, and the time lag could
have given more breathing space for Hong Kong investors so
that they could be less jittery. Furthermore, unique to
Hong Kong, the Stock Exchange was closed for four days
following Black Monday and the Futures Exchange also
suspended trading in Hang Seng Index futures for the same
period. The reason for the closure was that the sharp fall
on Monday and the further fall expected on the re-opening
of the Stock Exchange raised the likelihood of a number of
defaults by investors who had gone long in the Hang Seng
Index futures market. This raised serious concern as to
whether the Hong Kong Futures Guarantee Corporation would
be able to meet its obligations and whether confidence in
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Hong Kong's financial system could as a result have been
adversely affected. In the end, the four days closure gave
the officials of the General Committee of the Stock
Exchange and the Hong Kong Government time to assure and
reassure investors of the value of their shares in hand
and to plea for rationality and sanity. These tactics had
obviously worked.
The Hong Kong Government had also taken concrete
actions to restore confidence in the investors. For
example, negotiations were made so that two revolving
credit facilities could be made available to the Hong Kong
Futures Guarantee Corporation to enable it to meet its
obligations. One facility was up to HK$1000 million and
it was provided by the major brokers and shareholders of
the Hong Kong Future Guarantee Corporation. The second
facility, also up to HK$1000 million, was provided by the
Hong Kong Government. The two facilities run from 26th
October,1987 to 31st October, 1989.
Even so, when the market reopenea on LoLii
October,1987, the Hang Seng Index still fell by
approximately 33%. The Hong Kong Government once again
took action to boost public confidence. An additional
third standby facility totalling HK$2000 million was
arranged jointly by the Hong Kong Government, the Hong
Kona-and Shanghai Banking Corporation, Standard Chartered
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Bank and Bank of China. This third facility would have
been called upon should the first two facilities proved
inadequate to meet the Hong Kong Futures Guarantee
Corporation's commitments. But in the end, this standby
facility was not drawn and it expired on 30th April, 1988.
The swift actions and the subsequent announcements of
plans to reform the operation of the Hong Kong Stock
Exchange and the Hong Kong Futures Exchange in the light
of the weakness exposed during the Crash could have been
well received. Being a small market and in a small place,
rationality easily spread.
On concluding Part One of our study, we would note
that had our defined period of crash, 2nd October,1987 to
7th December, 1987, been shorter, the conclusion drawn
might have been different, that is, there could have been
less rationality among investors.- But we doubt any
significant difference unless the period is as short as
say, one trading day.
APPENDIX 1
QUINTILE ANALYSIS OF PRE- AND POST-CRASH SHARE PRIC
PERFORMANCE OF 263 COMPANIES
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-89.66% -41 .3 5%
APPENDIX 2
CORRELATION ANALYSIS OF PRE- AND POST-CRASH SHARE PRICE
PERFORMANCE OF 263 COMPANIES
DATA LIST FILE- B : TRY2 . DAT FREE X Y.
CORRELATION VARIABLES-X Y.
The raw data or -transformation pass is proceeding
263 cases are written to the uncompressed active file.







N of cases O 'V-00 • 1 - tailed Signif: .01 .001
is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed





REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF PRE- AND POST-CRASH SHARE PRICE
PERFORMANCE OF 263 COMPANIES
Listwise Deletion of Missing Data
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable..
Beginning Block Number 1. Method: Enter
Y
X
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable.
»•
i
Variable(s) Entered on Step Number
1 X
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SPECIAL SITUATIONS OF 59 COMPANIES
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THE 59 COMPANIES INVOLVED IN SPECIAL SITUATIONS
SORTED IN DESCENDING ORDER OF THEIR PRECRASH PRICE GAINS


























































































































































































APPENDIX. 6 (COLT' D)
GainDatE Company NaturE Am
41 10.87 HUEY TAI PLACING 39.9 115.45
42 9.87 HUEY TAI RESTRUCTURE 115.45
43 10.87 HUEY TAI SPLIT 115.45
44 10.87 WAH MAY INV RESTRUCTURE 118.00
45 9.87 IHD PLACING 150.`. 122.94
46 9.87 MAGNIFICENT PLACING 66.ul 125.45
47 9.87 VIDEOTECH PLACING 86.C 125.60
48 9.87 LAI SUN GARMENT RESTRUCTURE 127.14
49 9.87 JADEMAN PLACING 157.1 131.18
50 10.87 JADEMAN PLACING 181.6 131.18
51 9.87 SINO LAND PLACING 205.2 132.00
52 10.87 SING LAND PLACING 521.9 132.00
53 10.87 RUBY HLDG RESTRUCTURE 132.56
RESTRUCTURE9.87 CROCODILE 133.8154
38.4 134.6210.87 CHUNG CON PLACING55
5.6 142.119.87 CHINNEY INV PLACING56
38.5 142.42PLACING10.87 SHUI HING57
PLACING 103.0 147.4210.87 SEAPOWER58
156.62RESTRUCTURE10.87 YANGTIEKIANG59
60.8 159.77PLACING9.87 TSE SHUI LUN60










THE 59 COMPANIES INVOLVED IN SPECIAL SITUATIONS
SORTED IN DESCENDING ORDER OF THEIR PRICE DROPS DURING CRASK
























































9.87 K WAH STONE
10.87 CHUNGCON
9.87 LAI SUN GARMENT
9.87 IHD
9.87 TSE SHUI LUN




































































































































































































































































RISK AVERSE LOGIC: DATABASE
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SPSSPC+ The Statistical Package for IBM PC 12131-
SET BEEP OFF.
SET MORE OFF.
INC B : PROG
DATA LIST FILE:'B:RCUMBA.DAT rnwiMF I-IA fa) MflUFMPNT 17-21 (1)
EPS1 23-26 (2) EPS2 29-32 (2) DPS1 35-38 (2)
DPS2 41-44 (2) 800K 47-52 (1)
DEBT 55-60 (1) NO 62-67 (1) PRICE 71-75 (2)
GAIN 78-33 (1) BETA 84-39 (4).
MISSING VALUE EPS2 DPS2 (99.39)
MISSING VALUE BETA (.9999).
COMPUTE GEAR = DEBTBOOK.
COMPUTE PE1 = PRICEEPS1.
COMPUTE PE2 = PRICEEPS2.
COMPUTE YIELD1 = DPS1PRICE.
COMPUTE YIELD2 = DPS2PRICE.
COMPUTE MKT : PRICENO.
COMPUTE PREMIUM = MKTBOOK.
DESCP. IPTIVES VARIABLES: MOVE MEN T TO BETA GEAR PEl PE2 YIELD1 YIELD2 MKT PREMIUM
The raw data or transformation pass is proceeding
92 cases are written tc the uncompressed active file.
OPTION 3.
Page 2 SPSSPC+ 12181
Number of Valid Observations (Listwise) - 23. oo













































































































Page 3 SPSSPC+ 12131
APPENDIX 9 (CONT'D)

















































Page 4 SPSSPC- 12181



















P3ge 5 SPSSPC+ 12181
This procedure was completed at 16:37:39
CORRELATION VARIAB LES = MOVEMENTGAIN BETA GEAR PE1 PE2 YIELD1 YIELD2 MKT PREMIUM
OPTION 3.
Paae 6 SPSSPC+ 12181








































































N of cases: JLZt 2-tailed Signif: .01 .001
is orinted if a coefficient cannot be computed
Page 7 SPSS PC- 12181



















































N of cases: 28 . 2-tailed Signif : - .01 - .001
is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed
Page 8 SPSSPC+ 12181
This procedure was completed at 16:38:23
REGRESSION VARIABLE -ZMOVEMENT ZGEAR
WARNING 44c,, Text: ZMOVEMENT
VARIABLE NAME TOO LONG-- The limit is 8 and the name is truncated.
DEPENDENT - ZMOVEMENT
WARNING 426, Text: ZMOVEMENT
VARIABLE NAME TOO L0NG--A variable name is longer than 3 characters and is
being truncated to the first 8.
METHOD = enter ZGEAR
Page 9 SPSSPC 12131
MULTIPLE REGRESSION
Listwise Deletion of Missing Data
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable.. ZMOVEMEN ZSCOREv MOVEMENT)
Beginning Block Number 1. Method: enter ZGEAR
APPENDIX 9 (CONT'D)'
Page 10 SPSSPC+ 12131
MULTIPLE REGRESSION
Equation Number 1 Oependent Variable.. ZMOVEMEN ZSCORE(MOVEMENT)






















F = .06160 Signif F . 3046
Page 11 SPSSPC+ 12181
MULTIPLE REGRESSION
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable. ZMOVEMEN ZSCORE(MOVEMENT)
















End Block Number 1 All requested variables entered.
Page 12 SPSSPC+ 12131
This procedure was completed at 16:38:52
REGRESSION VARIABLE=ZMOVEMENT ZPE1
WARNING 446, Text: ZMOVEMENT
VARIABLE NAME TOO L0NG--The limit is 8 and the name is truncated.
DEPENDENT = ZMOVEMENT
WARNING 426, Text: ZMOVEMENT
VARIA8LE NAME TOO L0NG--A variable name is longer than 3 characters and is
being truncated to the first 8.
METHOD = enter ZPE1.
APPENDTX 9{CONT'D)
Page 13 SPSSPC+ 12181
MULTIPLE GRESSION
Listwiss Deletion of Missing Data
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable.. ZMOVEMEN ZSCORE(MOVEMENT;
Beginning Block Number 1. Metnod: Enter ZPEi
Page 14 SPSSPC+ I 21 S
MULTIPLE r t G H E S S .1 0 N
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable.. IMOVEME.N Z SCORE (MOVEMENT)
Variable(s) Entered on Step Number
1.. ZPE1 Z SCORE(Pel)
Multiple R .15006
R Square .02252















Sign if F-. it.4
Page 15 SPSSPC 12131
MULTIPLE REGRESSION
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable.. ZMOVEMEN ZSCORE(MOVEMENT)
Variab 1 er in t.Oe Equation
Variable B SE B Beta T Si T
ZPE1 .15006 .102? 15006 1.440 .1534
(constant)• 6.76998SE-JL6...... .000 1.0000
End Block Number 1 All requested va-«. abl os cn.-sred.
Page 16 5 r- o: 12 JSI




WARNING 446, Text: ZMOVEMENT
VARIABLE NAME TOO LONG—The limit is 8 and the name is truncated.
DEPENDENT = ZMOVEMENT
WARNING 426, Text: ZMOVEMENT '•
VARIABLE NAME TOO LONG--A variable name is longer than 8 characters and is
being truncated to the first 8.
METHOD = enter ZPE2.
Page 17 SPSSPC+ 12131
MULTIPLE REGRESSI ON
Listwise Deletion of Missing Data
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable. ZMOVEMEN ZSCORE CMOVEMENT)
Beginning Block Number 1. Method: Enter ZPE2
Page 18 SPSSPC+ 12181
MULTIPLE REGRESSION
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable.. ZMOVEMEN ZSCORE(MOVEMENT)






















F = 1.90505 Signif F = .1732
Page 19 SPSSPC+ 12181
MULTIPLE REGRESSION
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable.. ZMOVEMEN ZSC0RE(MOVEMENT)
















End Block Number 1 All requested variables entered.
Page 20 SPSSPC+ 12181
This procedure was completed at 16:39:36
REGRESSION VARIABLE ZMOVEMENT ZYIELD1
WARNING 446, Text: ZMOVEMENT
VARIABLE NAME TOO LONG--The limit is 8 and the name is truncated.
DEPENDENT= ZMOVEMENT
WARNING 426, Text: ZMOVEMENT
VARIABLE NAME TOO LONG--A variable name is longer than S characters and is
being truncated to the first 8.
METHOD= enter ZYIELDi.
Page 21 SPSSPC+ 12131
MULTIPLE REGRESSION
Listwise Deletion of Missing Data
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable.. ZMQVEMEN ZSCQP.Ef MOVEMENT)
Beginning Block Number 1. Method: Enter ZYIELDI
Page 22 SP5SPC+ 12131
MULTIPLE REGRESSION
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable.. ZMOVEMEN ZSCORE(MOVEMENT)


















Residual 90 74.45120 .32724
F= 20.00494 Signif F= .0000
Page 23 SPSSPC 12181
MULTIPLE REGRESSION
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable.. 2M0VEMEN ZSC0RE(MOVEMENT)
Variables in the Equation
Variable B SE B Beta T Sig T
ZYIELD1 .42644 .09534 .42644 4.473 .0000
(Constant) 7.82317QE-16 .09482 .000 1.0000
End Block Number 1 All requested variables entered.
Page 24 SPSSPC+ 12181
This procedure was completed at 16:39:53
REGRESSION VARIABLE=ZMOVEMENT ZYIELD2
WARNING 4461 Text: ZMOVEMENT
VARIABLE NAME TOO L0NG--The limit is 5 and the name is truncated.
DEPENDENT= ZMOVEMENT
WARNING 426, Text: ZMOVEMENT
VARIABLE NAME TOO LONG--A variable name is longer than 8 characters and is
being truncated to the first 8.
METHOD= enter ZYIELD2.
Page 25 SPSSPC+ 12181
MULTIPLE REGRESSION
Listwise Deletion of Missing Data
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable.. ZMOVEMEN ZSCORE(MOVEMENT)
Beginning Block Number 1. Method: Enter ZYIELD2
Page 26 SPSSPC+ 12191
MULT IPLE REGRESSION
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable.. ZMOVEMEN ZSCOREiMOVEMENT)
APPENDIX 9 (CONT'D)























Page 27 SPSSPC+ 12131
MULTIPLE REGRESSION
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable.. 2M0VEMEN ZSC0RE(M0v'EMENT)















End Block Number 1 All requested variables entered.
Page 23 SPSSPC+- 12131
This procedure was completed at 16:40:18
REGRESSION VARIABLE= ZMOVEMENT ZMKT
WARNING 446, Text: ZMOVEMENT
VARIABLE NAME TOO L0NG--The limit is S and the name is truncated.
DEPENDENT= ZMOVEMENT
WARNING 426, Text: ZMOVEMENT
VARIABLE NAME TOO LONG--A variable name is longer than 8 characters and is
being truncated to the first 8.
METHOD= enter ZMKT.
Page 29 SPS5PC+ 12181
MULTIPLE REGRESSION
Listwise Deletion of Missing Data
APPENDIX 9 (CONT'D)
0
Equation Number i Dependent Variable.. ZMOVEMEN ZSCORE(MOVEMENT)
Beginning Block Number 1. Method: Enter ZMKT
Page 30 SPSSPC+ 12181
MULTIPLE REGRESSION
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable.. ZMOVEMEN • ZSCORE(MOVEMENT)



















Page 31 SPSSPC+ 12181
MULTIPLE REGRESSION
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable.. ZMOVEMEN Z SCOPE MOVEMENT .»
Variables in the Equation
variable B SE B Beta T Sig T
ZMKT .27282 .10141 .27282 2.690 .0085
(Constant) 6.620178E-16 .10086 .000.1.0000
End Block Number 1 All requested variables entered.
Page 32 SPSSPC+ 12181
This procedure was completed at 16:40:40
REGRESSION VARIABLE=ZMOVEMENT ZPREMIUM
WARNING 446, Text: ZMOVEMENT
VARIABLE NAME TOO LONG—The limit is 8 and the name is truncated
DEPENDENT = ZMOVEMENT
APPENDIX 9 (CONT'D)
WARNING 426, Text: ZMOVEMENT
VARIABLE NAME TOO LONG— A variable name is longer than 2 characters and is
being truncated to the first 8.
METHOD= enter ZPREMIUM.
Rage 33 SPSSPC+ 12181
MULTIPLE REGRESSION
Listwise Deletion of Missing Data
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable.. ZMOVEMEN Z2CGP.E(MOVEMENT;
Beginning Block Number 1. Method: Enter ZPREMIUM
Page 34 SPSSPC 12131
MULTIPLE REGRESSION
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable.. ZMOVEMEN Z CCOP.E( MOVEMENT•






















1 .00' 4 8
Page 35 SPSSPC+ 1•- 3.i. 4- I W-i.
MULTIPLE REGRESSION
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable.. ZMOVEMEN ZSCORE(MOVEMENT)
Variables in the Equation
Variable B SE B Beta T Sig T
ZPREMIUM .04020 .10532 .04020 .392 .7036
(Constant) 6.772230E-11 .1045 .000 1.0000
APPENDIX 9 (CONT'D)
End Block Number 1 All requested variables entered.
Paae 36 SPSSPC+ 12181
This procedure was completed at 16:41:02
REGRESSION VARIABLE=ZMOVEMENT ZGAIN
WARNING 446, Text: ZMOVEMENT
VARIABLE NAME TOO L0NG--The limit is 8 and the name is truncated.
DEPENDENT= ZMOVEMENT
WARNING 426, Text: ZMOVEMENT
VARIABLE NAME TOO LQNG--A variable name is longer than 8 characters and is
being truncated to the first 8.
METHOD= enter ZGAIN.
Page 37 SPSSPC 12181
MULTIPLE REGRESSION
Listwise Deletion of Missing Data
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable.. ZMOVEMEN ZSC0RE(MOVEMENT)
Beginning Block Number 1. Method: Enter ZGAIN
Page 38 SPSSPC-4- 12181
MULTIPLE REGRESSION
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable.. ZMOVEMEN ZSC0RE(MOVEMENT)
Variable(s) Entered on Step Number






















Page 39 SPSSPC+ 121S1
MULTIPL- REGRESSION
APPENDIX 9 (CONT'D)
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable.. ZMOVEMEN ZSCORE(MOVEMENT)
Variables in the Equation
Variable B SE B Beta T Sig T
ZGAIN -.06526 .10518 -.06526 -.620 .5365
(Constant) 6.500277E-16 .10461 .000 1.0000
End Block Number 1 All requested variables entered.
Page 40 SPSSPC 12181
This procedure was completed at 16:41:24
REGRESSION VARIAB LE= ZMOVEMENTZBETA
WARNING 446, Text: ZMOVEMENT
VARIABLE NAME TOO L0NG--The limit is 8 and the name is truncated
DEPENDENT- ZMOVEMENT
WARNING 426, Text: ZMOVEMENT
VARIABLE NAME TOO LONG--A variable name is longer than 8 characters and is
being truncated to the first 8.
METHOD r enter ZBETA.
Page 41 SPSSPC 12181
MULTIPLE REGRESSION
Listwise Deletion of Missing Data
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable.. ZMOVEMEN ZSCORE(MOVEMENT)
Beginning Block Number 1. Method: Enter ZBETA
Page 42 SPSSPC+ 12181
MULTIPLE REGRESSION
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable.. ZMOVEMEN ZSCORE(MOVEMENT)























Page 43 SPSSPC 12181
MULTIPLE REGRESSION
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable.. ZM0VEMEN ZSCORE(MOVEMENT)
Variables in the Equation
Variable B SE B Beta T Sig T
ZBETA -.33520 .08712 -.60235 -I.e48 .0007
(Constant) .432c,5 .Oe555 5.291 .0000
End Block Number 1 All requested variables entered.
Page 57 SPSSPC+ 12181








Listwise Deletion of Missing Data
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable.. MOVEMENT
Beginning Block Number 1. Method: Enter GEAR
Page 59 SPSSPC+ 121S1
MULTIPLE REGRESSION
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable.. MOVEMENT























Page 60 SPSS PO 12131
MULTIPLE REGRESSION
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable.. MOVEMENT
Variables in the Equation
Variable B SE B Beta T Sia T
GEAR -.51699 2.08304 -.02615 -.248 .8046
(Constant') -59.51339 1.64866 -36.098 .0000
End Block Number 1 All requested variables entered.
Page 61 SPSSPC 12181
This procedure was completed at 16:43:40
REGRESSION VARIABLE-MOVEMENT PE1
DEPENDENT = MOVEMENT
METHOD = enter PE1.
19
APPENDIX 9 (CONT'D)
Page 62 SPSSPC+ 12181
MULTIPLE REGRESSION
Listwise Deletion of Missing Data
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable.. MOVEMENT
Beginning Block Number 1. Method: Enter PE1
Page 63 SPSSPC f 12181
MULTIPLE REGRESSION
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable.. MOVEMENT























Page 64 SPSSPC+ 12181
MULTIPLE REGRESSION
Eauation Number 1 Dependent Variable.. MOVEMENT
Variables in the Equation
Variable B SE B Beta T Sig T
PE1 .01226 3.51212E-03 .15006 1.440 .1534
(Constant) -60.23306 1.43674 -41.923 .0000
End Block Number 1 All requested variables entered.
Page 65 SPSSPC f 12131





Page 66 SPSSPC+ 12181
MULTIPLE REGRESSION
Listwise Deletion of Missing Data
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable.. MOVEMENT
Beginning Block Number 1. Method: Enter PE2
Page 67 SPSSPC+ 12181
MULTIPLE REGRESSION
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable.. MOVEMENT























Page 68 SPSSPC+ 12191
MULTIPLE REGRESSION
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable.. MOVEMENT
Variables in the Equation
Variable B SE B Beta T Sig T
PE2 .22865 .20913 .18460 1.380 .1732
(Constant) -62.82218 4.13516 -15.192 .0000
End Block Number 1 All requested variables entered.
Page 69 SPSSPC+ 12181
APPENDIX 9 (CONT'D)
This procedure was completed at 16:44:19
REGRESSION VARIABLE=MOVEMENT YIELD1
DEPENDENT = MOVEMENT
METHOD = enter YIELD1.
Page 70 SPSSPC+ 12181
MULTIPLE REGRESSION
Listwise Deletion of Missing Data
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable.. MOVEMENT
Beginning Block Number 1. Method: Enter YIELD1
Page 71 SPSSPC+ 12181
MULTIPLE REGRESSION
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable.. MOVEMENT























Page 72 SPSSPC+ 12181
MULTIPLE REGRESSION
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable.. MOVEMENT
Variables in the Equation
Variable B SE B Beta T Sig T
YIELD1 • 378.27985 84.57550 .42644 4.473 .0000
(Constant) -69.10074 2.45298 -2e.l70 .0000
APPENDIX 9 CONT'D)
End Block Number 1 All requested variables entered.
Page 73 SPSSPC+ 12181
This procedure was completed at 16:44:39
REGRESSION VARIABLE=MOVEMENT YIELD2
DEPENDENT = MOVEMENT
METHOD = enter YIELD2.
Page 74 SPSSPC+ 12181
MULTIPLE REGRESSION
Listwise Deletion of Missing Data
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable.. MOVEMENT
Beginning Block Number 1. Method: Enter YIELD2
Page 75 SPSS PC- 12181
MULTIPLE REGRESSION
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable.. MOVEMENT























Page 76 SPSSPC+ 12131
MULTIPLE REGRESSION
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable.. MOVEMENT
Variables in the Equation
Variable B SE B Beta T Sig T
YIELD2 65.57345 93.5o672 .09461 .t65 .500
APPENDIX 9 (CONT'D)
(Constant) -58.29976 3.24094 -17.989 .0000
End Block Number 1 All requested variables entered.
Paae 77 SPSSPC 12181
This procedure was completed at 16:44:58
REGRESSION VARIABLE=MOVEMENT MKT
DEPENDENT = MOVEMENT
METHOD = enter MKT.
Page 78 SPSSPC+ 12181
MULTIPLE REGRESSION
Listwise Deletion of Missing Dat3
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable.. MOVEMENT
Beginning Block Number 1. Method: Enter MKT
Page 79 SPSSPC 12131
MULTIPLE REGRESSION
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable.. MOVEMENT























Page 80 SPSSPC+ 12181
M UL TIPLE REGRESSION
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable.. MOVEMENT
Variables in the Equation
APPENDIX 9 (CONT'D)
Variable B SE B Beta T Sig T• 9 •
MKT 3.692379E-04 1.37249E-04 .27282 2.690 .0085
(Constant) -62.22121 1.64238 -37.885 .0000
End Block Number 1 All requested variables entered.
Page 81 SPSSPC+ 12181
This procedure was completed at 16:45:18
REGRESSION VARIABLE=MOVEMENT PREMIUM
DEPENDENT = MOVEMENT
METHOD = enter PREMIUM.
Page 82 SPSSPC+ 12181
MULTIPLE REGRESSION
Listwise Deletion of Missing Data
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable.. MOVEMENT
Beginning Block Number 1. Method: Enter PREMIUM
Page 83 SPSSPC+ 12181
MULTIPLE REGRESSION
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable.. MOVEMENT























Page 84 SPSSPC 12131
MULTIPLE REGRESSION
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable.. MOVEMENT
APPENDIX 9 (CONT'D)
Variables in the Equation
Variable B SE B Beta T Sig T
PREMIUM .14200 .37203 .04020 .382 .7036
(Constant) -60.39422 2.2462B -26.886 .0000
End Block Number 1 All requested variables entered;
Page 85 SPSSPC+ 12181
This procedure was completed at 16:45:38
REGRESSION VARIABLEMOVEMENT GAIN
DEPENDENT = MOVEMENT
METHOD = enter GAIN.
Page 86 SPSSPC + 12181
MULTIPLE REGRESSION
Listwise Deletion of Missing Data
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable.. MOVEMENT
Beginning Block Number 1. Method: Enter GAIN
Page 87 SPSSPC+ 12181
MULTIPLE REGRESSION
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable.. MOVEMENT























P3ge 88 SPSSPC+ 12181
MULTIPLE REGRESSION
APPENDIX 9 (CONT'D)
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable.. MOVEMENT
Variables in the Equation
Variable B SE B Beta T Sig T
GAIN -6.20671E-03 .01000 -.06526 -.620 .5365
(Constant) -59.09288 1.73723 -34.015 .0000
End Block Number 1 All requested variables entered.
Page 89 SPSSPC 12181
This procedure was completed at 16:45:58
REGRESSION VARIABLE-MOVEMENT BETA
DEPENDENT = MOVEMENT
METHOD = enter BETA.
Page 90 SPS5PC+ 12181
MULTIPLE REGRESSION
Listwise Deletion of Missing Data
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable.. MOVEMENT
Beginning Block Number 1. Method. Enter BETA
Page 91 SPSSPC+ 12181
MULTIPLE REGRESSION
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable.. MOVEMENT
























Page 92 SPSSPC+ 12181
multiple regression
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable.. MOVEMENT
Variables in the Equation
Variable B SE 8 Beta T Sig T
BETA -15.18979 3.94771 -.60235 -3.848 .0007
(Constant) -39.75716 3.78748 -10.497 .0000









2 FAR EAST HLDG
3 ALLIED PROP
























28 K HAH STONE
29 HENDERSONINV
30 NEW WORLDHOTEL








39 HK S HOTEL
40 LIU CHONGHING
























































































































































































































































65 WING LUNG BK
66 CAFE 0E CORAL
67 TVB
68 HSBC





































































































































































































9 HK Y F
10 MIRAMER
11 GREEN ISLAND


















30 K WAH STONE
































































































































































































































































19 KWONG SANG HONC
20 REALTY DEV
21 WING LUNG BK
22 WORMALD PACIFIC




27 WING ON HLDG
28 SHK PROP
29 LUKS IND


















48 TAI SHING DEV
'49 SAN mIG




































































































































































































































Company Move PEI EPS1 Prir.e
55 SWIRE
56 HYSAN
. 57 HENDERSON INV
58 BANK EAST ASIA
59 WONG IND
. 60 DAIRY FARM
61 HUTCHISON







69 NEW WORLD DEV
.70 CMB
71 JARDINE m
72 FAR EAST .CON
73 NEW WORLD HOTEL
74 HK Y F
75 HK S HOTEL
76 ASSO HOTEL
77 MIRAMER





83 FAR EAST HLDG
'84 GREAT EAGLE
85 DAO HENG HLDG
86 HK TEL















































































































































































































































































































































































































Compan: Mov Price EPS2PE2
average average
-53.345 BANK EAST ASIA 35.00 1.5422.13
-51.4 2.2446 HANG SENG BANK 51.0022.77
-65.047 PAUL Y 3.88 0.1722.82
-61.848 SHAW BROS 7.00 0.2924.14
-37.5 0.389.4049 HK LAND 24.74
-65.2 6.05 0.2450 HOPEWELL 25.21
-56.8 0.7751 JSH 19.5025.32
-55.4 66.00 2.4952 HK S HOTEL 26.51
-58.3 0.369.9027.5053 HK YF
-49.5 0.6922.3032.3254 HK C GAS


















14 CAFE OE CORAL
- 15 ELEC ELEK





21 FAR EAST CON


















40 TAI SHING DEV
41 SAN idIG
42 WING LUNG BK
43 GREEN ISLAND




























































































































































































Company Move Mkt Share Price
46 LAM SOON
47 ALLIED PROP


























































































































































































































































































37 BANK EAST ASIA
38 WONGIND
39 LIU CHONGHING





















































































































































































































































































































































































73 HANG SENG BANK
74 KMB


































































































































































































































































2 HANG SENG BANK
3 BANK EAST ASIA
4 PALIBURG
5 DAO HENG HIDG










































48 TAI SHING DEV





































































































































































































































Company Move n= n t NT A TTRRTS











































































































































































































6 BANK EAST ASIA
7 DAIRY FARM
8 HAECO ,
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